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Abstract
State’s border and boundary have important role to definite state jurisdiction, included maritime
borders and boundaries. State jurisdiction on the ocean will impact to economic value that
can be earned by the state and political activity. This article explains what governance can do
to maximize maritime utilization and maintain marine ecosystem by strengthen international
cooperation without spoiling national’s jurisdiction among the states. This article suggests that
a group of States have acknowledged that adequate ecosystem management, particularly in a
changing climate, requires imaginative thinking about how to work flexibly across delineated
political boundaries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Global maritime boundaries are highly contested. States have
understandably made the extension of maritime jurisdictions a political
priority becomes the extension of maritime boundaries under the law of
the sea regime secures legal rights to assert management over both living
and non-living marine resources. States have long recognized the value
in nationalizing or at least regionalizing maritime zones. For example, in
August 1952, the leaders of Chile, Ecuador and Peru on the justification
of food security and sustainable development entered a “Declaration on
the Maritime Zone” stating that the maritime zones recognized under
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
were “insufficient to permit the conservation, development and use of
those [living and nonliving] resources, to which the coastal countries
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are entitled.”1 In response, the three States decided among themselves
that “each of them possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
area of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not
less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast.”
With the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, States were directed to cooperate across political boundaries.
Article 63 requires States sharing stocks across exclusive economic zones
to “seek, either directly or through appropriate sub regional or regional
organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and
ensure the conservation and development” of shared stocks.2 The same
article requires parties to “seek…to agree” through shared governance
organizations measures to conserve stocks straddling across a high seas
and exclusive economic zone boundary. 3 On the high seas States are
expected to cooperate over the conservation and management of living
resources by establishing sub regional or regional fishing organizations.
States have made efforts to coordinate resource management across
boundaries through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and
Regional Seas Programmes. Some of these programs have had greater
success in creating cooperative frameworks than other programs. A lack
of political will to achieve even basic conservation outcomes for target
stocks has undermined the credibility of some organizations such as
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna.4 Other
organizations such as Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence Research, Limits in the Sea: No.
88 Maritime Boundary: Ecuador-Peru: (October 2, 1979): 4 at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/58821.pdf (Providing English translation of 1952 Tripartite
Declaration on the Maritime Zone)
2
UNCLOS Article 63(1)
3
Ibid. Article 63(2)
4
U.S. Senator John Kerry, “Senate Resolution 180- Expressing the Sense of the
Senate Regarding the Policy of the United States at the 17th Regular Meeting of the
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna in Murcia, Spain”,
Congressional Record (November 13, 2001): 22269 (Commenting that” I am sad to
report that many ICCAT member nations have failed to comply with basic ICCAT
quota and minimum size regulations for several important species…Furthermore, it is
my understanding that some ICCAT member nations have undermined essential conservation plans from the outset for several ICCAT species, by simply setting a quota
that is in flagrant disregard of the best advice of the scientific community.”)
1
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Marine Living Species have been more successful in convincing States
to require ecosystem based fishing practices in the Southern Oceans as
evidenced by their regulation of the krill industry and fishing bycatch.5
With increasing pressures on ocean resources arising from warming
oceans and acidifying seas, continued dysfunction in cooperative
resource governance will only delay needed transboundary ecological
management interventions. Quite recently, States have acknowledged
that the existing ocean governance system is inadequate to address the
immense external pressures on the system. In response, States agreed
to Sustainable Development Goal 14 for States to “conserve and
sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable
development.”6
States agreed to pursue ten targets:
Target 14.1: By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine
pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including
marine debris and nutrient pollution.
Target 14.2: By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and
coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by
strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in
order to achieve healthy and productive oceans.
Target 14.3: Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification,
including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels.
Target 14.4: By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end
overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive
fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in
order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time possible, at least to levels
that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their
biological characteristics.”
Mary Ruckelshaus et al. “Marine Ecosystem-based Management in Practice: Scientific and Governance Challenges”, BioScience, 58(1) (1 January 2008): 53–63
(e.g. CCAMLR uses models of krill productivity to set sustainable harvest targets that
were decreased by 25% to reflect an amount that scientists estimated predators needed
for consumption. CCAMLR also sets thresholds for incidental bycatch. Once these
thresholds have been met, a target fishery will be closed.)
6
United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015) at p. 20.
5
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Target 14.5: By 2020, conserve at least 10 percent of coastal and
marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based
on the best available scientific information.
Target 14.6: By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies
which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies
that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain
from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and
effective special and differential treatment for developing and least
developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade
Organisation fisheries subsidies negotiation.
Target 14.7: By 2030, increase the economic benefits to small island
developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable
use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of
fisheries, aquaculture and tourism.
Target 14.a: Increase scientific knowledge, develop research
capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines
on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean
health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the
development of development countries, in particular small island
developing States and least developed countries.
Target 14.b: Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to
marine resources and markets.
Target 14.c: Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans
and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the
legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and
their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of “The Future we Want.”7
While States can seek to achieve these targets through transboundary
cooperation, it is not obvious from the text of the SDG 14 targets
that the success of many of these targets will depend on the ability
of States to integrate actions across national boundaries. There is no
acknowledgment that politically delineated boundaries can create
stumbling blocks for achieving SDGs unless States agree to re-imagine
7

Ibid. at pp. 20-21.
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the function of boundaries in addressing ecosystem health across
seascapes. The word “boundary” does not appear in the SDGs and the
only allusion to spatial boundaries are the references in Target 14.2
to “marine and coastal ecosystems” and Target 14.5 to “coastal and
marine areas.”
In June 2017, 178 States and the European Union met in New
York at the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation
of Sustainable Development Goal 14. The States adopted a resolution
entitled “our ocean, our future: call for action” recognizing “different
national realities” and a variety of “national policies and priorities.”8
The resolution urged states to integrate Goal 14 and its targets “into
national development plans and strategies, to promote national
ownership” and for strengthened cooperation between and among
“international organizations, regional and subregional organizations
and institutions, arrangements and programmes.”9 States were urged
to enhance engagement “with global, regional and subregional bodies
and programmes, the scientific community, the private sector, the donor
community, non-governmental organizations, community groups,
academic institutions, and other relevant actors.”10
While it is clear that multi-level cooperation requires working across
physical boundaries with government and non-government actors in
multiple States, the Conference documents seem to assume that political
boundaries are permeable for purposes of achieving SDG 14. Seven
concept papers were drafted in preparation for the ocean conference
covering a range of topics related to SDG targets from marine pollution
to sustainable fisheries. Somewhat surprisingly, the often contentious
issues of boundaries and the possibility of re-imagining boundaries to
achieve some of the shared goals was addressed only fleetingly by two
of the concept papers. The concept paper for the partnership dialogue
on enhancing conservation and sustainable use of oceans through
implementation of UNCLOS observed that coastal States are expected
to clearly define and publicize the limits of their maritime zones
because “they provide legal certainty with regard to the extent of the
Report of the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14 A/CONF.230/14 (June 5-9, 2017): paras. 7 and 9
9
Ibid. at para. 13(b)
10
Ibid. at para. 13(c)
8
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sovereignty or sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal States.”11 The
paper goes on to observe that “overlapping maritime claims exist, which
can adversely impact…effective management.”12 The concept paper on
conserving and restoring marine and coastal ecosystems recognized
that Large Marine Ecosystems “generally transcend legal boundaries
and encompass the maritime zones of two or more countries, thereby
fostering international cooperation among countries, but also presenting
a major governance challenge.”13
These brief key references to delineating maritime claims and large
marine ecosystems should be at the centre of any efforts to achieve
ocean sustainability. This paper argues that greater political investment
needs to be made in securing institutional arrangements that are
capable of transcending political boundaries to achieve sustainability
targets by focusing on maritime boundaries as border regions rather
than delineations. The following section will explore the juxtaposition
of boundaries and borders. The third section will describe a number
of ongoing global efforts to transcend maritime boundaries to achieve
ecosystem and provide some observations about existing challenges
associated with these efforts. The final section will ask whether the
existing approaches offer a model that can be adapted to governance of
other seascapes.
II. BOUNDARIES VS. BORDERS
One explanation for a lukewarm level of cooperation in some ocean
regions is the continued political pursuit to define boundaries rather
than borders. The concept of “boundary” versus “border” is more
than just a semantic difference. Boundaries are understood as sites of
stable territorial demarcation. They exist to define sovereign interests
United Nations Ocean Conference, Concept Paper: Partnership dialogue 7: Enhancing the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Oceans and Their Resources by Implementing International Law as Reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (2017) https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14402Pa
rtnershipdialogue7.pdf
12
Ibid.
13
United Nations Ocean Conference, Concept Paper: Partnership dialogue 2: Managing, protecting, conserving and restoring marine and coastal ecosystems (2017)https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14430Partnershipdialogue2.pdf
11
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within which States can assert political authority over property. Fixing
of boundary points is an exercise in “the will of the sovereign.”14 In
securing State jurisdictional interests, States are increasingly wary of
creating an administrative record that suggests the possibility of one
State acquiescing to another State’s interests.15
Among the first multilateral negotiations involving the law of the sea,
States focused attention on defining and securing individual maritime
boundaries and entitlements. These first negotiations were triggered
by perceived threats of unilateral jurisdictional expansion. In 1945,
United States President Harry S Truman announced the extension of
U.S. jurisdiction over natural resources located on the U.S. continental
shelf and over the high seas fisheries resources adjacent to the U.S.
coast in order to secure conservation.16 In 1946, Argentina unilaterally
asserted interests over its continental shelf and Panama declared in its
constitution that the continental shelf was part of its national territory.17
Exhibiting both opportunism and an expansive imagination, Chile,
Peru, and Ecuador in 1952 asserted interests over a 200 nautical mile
zone. 18
Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), ICJ Judgment of 3 Feb. 1994, [1994] ICJ Rep 6, at para. 4
15
See e.g. Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), ICJ Judgment of 23 May 2008
(Finding that Malaysia acquiesced through a series of statements and omissions to
title being secured for Singapore in the island of Pedra Blanca)
16
Harry S. Truman, Proclamation 2668, Policy of the United States with respect to
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas (28 September 1945);Harry S.
Truman, Proclamation 2667 Policy of the United States with respect to the Natural
Resources of the Subsoil and the Sea-Bed of the Continental Shelf (28 September
1945); Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 9634, Providing for the Establishment of
Fishery Conservation Zones
17
Argentina, October 9, 1946 Declaration Proclaiming Sovereignty over the Epicontinental Sea and the Continental Shelf, Decree 14708, Boletin Oficial de la Republica
Argentina (5 December 1946)(Recognizing “the right of every nation to consider the
entire extent of the epicontinental sea and the adjacent continental shelf as national
territory.”; Panama Constitution (1 March 1946): Article 209-4.
18
Tripartite Agreement, supra note 1. (Proclaiming “as a principle of their international maritime policy, that each of them possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the area of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not less than
200 nautical miles from the said coast.”
14
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In response to this flurry of jurisdictional expansion, delegates
to the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958
drafted four multilateral conventions that are collectively known as the
“Geneva Conventions”. While the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf did
not conclusively define the boundaries, they emphasized the bounded
nature of sovereignty. For example, if interests in a jurisdictional zone
overlap as in the case of continental shelf entitlements, States are
expected to negotiate boundaries.19
States were not satisfied with the ambiguity of the Geneva
Conventions and in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, States specified the extent of the geographical boundaries for
a coastal State’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic
zone, and continental shelf. The concept of boundaries continued to
“harden” as State parties to UNCLOS are expected to deposit with the
Secretary-General of the U.N. all charts showing straight baselines that
close the mouths of rivers and bays, 20archipelagic baselines, 21 and
the outer limits of a State’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive
economic zone, and continental shelf. 22 While a declaration of maritime
limits and boundaries may contribute to predictable relations among
States, these limits and boundaries can create barriers for action when
focusing on conserving and restoring ecological relationships. Political
boundaries are particularly problematic for managing migrating species
since migration patterns rarely conform to regional geopolitics.
A more relevant concept for cooperation to achieve SDG 14 is the
concept of a border as a space that defines interests but is also open to flux
and possible changes. While borders can be articulated as boundaries,
they can also be understood as places across which ideas, goods, people,
and other species flow. In terms of marine environmental governance,
Convention on the Continental Shelf (29 April 1958) (In force 10 June 1964),
U.N.T.S. 7302 vol. 499, pp. 312-321: Article 6 (“Where the same continental shelf is
adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other,
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined
by agreement between them.”)
20
UNCLOS Article 16
21
Ibid at Article 47
22
Ibid. at Articles 16, 75, and 84.
19
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the concept of permeable borders is far more relevant than that of a
permanent boundary registered with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. This is because ecological relations exist across borders. An
ecological map of the global oceans based on large marine ecosystems
or seascape diverges from a map based on political boundaries.
Marine scientists and policy scholars have long recognized the
disconnect between governance at the political boundary level and
the ecological realities of complex marine ecosystems.23 In the
1980s, Kenneth Sherman at U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and Lewis Alexander at the University of Rhode Island
introduced the concept of a “Large Marine Ecosystem” (LME) as a
framework for analyzing regional sustainability. 24 The researchers
identified 64 LMEs composed of both coastal lands and ocean waters
and proposed evaluating through an interdisciplinary approach each
ecosystem on the basis of nutrient and primary productivity, fish stock
populations and biomass, marine and land-based pollution, human
marine activities, and governance. Key to the concept of an LME is
the ability for States to cooperate across their boundaries by blurring
boundaries into borders between States.
A viable LME cannot be constrained to the jurisdictional boundaries
provided for under UNCLOS whenever there are species capable of
traveling long distances or negative consequences for a habitat from
further fragmentation of habitat (e.g. limited gene pool for future
restoration efforts). To the extent that the maritime boundaries are
arbitrarily derived from the formulas available under UNCLOS, there
is a risk of under-management across the range of a LME.
Lawrence Juda, “Consideration in Developing a Functional Approach to the Governance of Large Marine Ecosystems” 30 Ocean Development & International Law 2
(1999) :93 “[O]ne of the basic problems faced by those who favour ecosystem-based
management approaches is the lack of congruence between what might be termed
‘politically defined space,’ that, is the geographic area encompassed by particular human governance systems, and ‘ecologically defined space’ composed of the area over
which natural ecosystems extend.”
24
Kenneth Sherman “Large Marine Ecosystems: Stress, Mitigation, and Sustainability” Large Marine Ecosystems: Stress, Mitigation and Sustainability (ed. Kenneth
Sherman and Lewis Alexander) (AAAS Press, Washington DC, 1993); Kenneth Sherman “The large marine ecosystem concept: A research and management strategy for
living marine resources.” Ecological Applications 1(4) (1991): 349-360
23
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If Sustainable Development Goal 14 and particularly Targets 14.1,
14.2, and 14.3 are to be realized by coastal States, States must address
the existing disconnect between political boundaries and ecological
borders as reflected in the identification of LMEs. To do this requires
reconceiving of “scale.” The next section describes a variety of multipartner cooperative conservation efforts being undertaken at the
ecosystem level. In particular, the article will cover (1) unique highlevel collaboration among six Asia-Pacific States that has resulted in the
creation of the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) (2) collaboration in the
Caribbean Saragasso Sea among a number of States and organizations
to protect and conserve a unique ecosystem existing largely beyond
national jurisdiction and (3) the multi-state LME commissions in
Asia and Africa. On the basis of reviewing academic literature and
documents produced by the CTI parties, the Sargasso Sea Commission,
and the LME Commissions, the article will identify some of the legal
and institutional challenges of implementing the initiative in the
regions. Given both the regional and global pressures particularly on
living marine resources, the article concludes by questioning whether
the governance models designed around socio-ecological borders rather
than political boundaries can be further disseminated into other regions
that share large marine ecosystems or seascapes.
III.OCEAN GOVERNANCE MODELS THAT TRANSCEND
BOUNDARIES
With centuries of efforts dedicated to delineating ocean boundaries but
only approximately 40 years of sustained effort in coordinating ecosystem
management between States, many States have only recently begun to
invest resources in designing transboundary governance arrangements
to further ecosystem protection, conservation, and restoration. While
this article is not intended to be a comprehensive compendium of
existing and former efforts to design transboundary institutions,25 this
For example, Agulhas and Somali Current LME, Bay of Bengal LME, Canary
Current LME, Guinea Current LME, Gulf of Mexico LME, Humboldt Currrent LME,
Abrolhos Seascape (off Bahia, Brazil), Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape (Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama), Glover’s Reef Seascape (Belize), Patagonian and
Southwest Atlantic Seascape, Vatu-i-Ra Seascape (Fiji)
25
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article describes three examples of State-based transboundary marine
governance initiatives and the potential of these initiatives to serve
as models for other regions who have made commitments to achieve
the Sustainable Development Goals. Environmental regimes where
principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking are centred around a
limited set of issue have been shown to improve cooperation.26 All of the
examples discussed below promote “ecosystem-based management”
understood in this article as management practices promoting:
1) The protection of structures, functions and key processes within a
specific place-based ecosystem and
2) The integration of ecological, social, economic and institutional
needs.
Because the focus on this article is on States reconceiving political
boundaries in the context of shared ecological borders, the examples
chosen were selected because they involve multiple States who have
exhibited a high-level of political will. While outside entities such as
NGOs, influential individuals, or intergovernmental organizations were
responsible for initiating the ecosystem based governance efforts and
continue to be involved with ongoing financing and technical support,
each of the examples below illustrates long-term regional political
commitment. The three examples discussed are the Southeast Asian
Coral Triangle Initiative, the Caribbean Sargasso Sea effort, and the
Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem.
A. THE CORAL TRIANGLE INITIATIVE GOVERNANCE
MODEL AND BORDERS
The Coral Triangle covers an ocean and coastal of 5.7 million square
kilometres (approximately half the size of the United States land mass)
including portions of Indonesia, portions of Malaysia, the Philippines,
Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands region.27 The
region takes its name from the fact that 76% of all global coral species
can be found somewhere in the Coral Triangle. The region is globally
recognized as a place of great biological and cultural significance due to
Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources
and the Environment (Cornell University Press, 1989)
27
Pedro Fidelman et al. “Governing Large-Scale Marine Commons: Contextual Challenges in the Coral Triangle” 36 Marine Policy (2012) at p. 43.
26
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its ecological diversity that include 37% of the world’s reef fish species
and important nurseries for blue whales.
With approximately 100 million of the 363 million people living
in the Coral Triangle primarily dependent on coastal resources for
sustenance, humans have impacted the region’s unique ecosystems
through overfishing and habitat degradation. The long-term prognosis of
climate change impacts within the region such as warming oceans, coral
bleaching, and ocean acidification does not deliver a positive narrative
for regional sustainability. Recognising existing and future pressures
on the regional ocean system, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono proposed an intergovernmental effort among neighboring
States leading to the creation of the “Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral
Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security” (CTI). His proposal was for all
of the States bordering the biodiverse region to harmonize marine
management objectives and coordinate mechanisms for achieving the
objectives.
The Coral Triangle has not been defined as a separate LME but
includes regions designated by Sherman and Alexander as parts of
the Indonesian Sea and the Sulu-Celebes Sea. Applying a bioregional
framework to area, Green and Mous mapped the shared sea space
and identified 11 ecoregions and 32 functional seascapes within the
ecoregions.28 While “LME” as a term of reference has not been selected
by the CTI parties, States are committed to implementing a variation of
an LME governance framework that changes boundaries into borders.
The term “seascape” within the CTI refers to “large, multiple-use marine
areas defined scientifically and strategically, in which government
authorities, private organizations and other stakeholders cooperate to
conserve the diversity and abundance of marine life and to promote
A.l. Green and P.J. Mous Delineating the Coral Triangle, its Ecoregions and Functional Seascapes v. 5. The Nature Conservancy Coral Triangle Program Report 1/08
(2008); The term “seascape” has been used by the NGOs World Wide Fund for Nature and Wildlife Conservation Society for over 15 years as a biogeographic term.
Conservation International (CI) expanded the concept of a “seascape” when it began
its two large projects in the Coral Triangle region before the Coral Triangle Initiative
was launched as an regional initiative by the President of indonesia. As used by CI,
a functional “seascape” depends on good governance at local, national and regional
level to deliver ecosystem and sustainability benefits.
28
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human well-being.”29
In 2009, the parties agreed at a Summit in Manado, Sulawesi in
Indonesia to a non-binding agreement to develop “seascapes” for
sustainable management by 2020, apply ecosystem based management
to fisheries and other marine resources in the region, establish regionwide MPAs, cooperate to improve the status of threatened species,
and introduce a “region-wide early action plan” for climate change
adaptation to be implemented by 2015. 30 This Regional Plan of Action
is intended to influence national decision-making.
What makes the CTI initiative unique as a governance model is
the effort by leaders at the highest levels of government to work with
ecological experts to redesign the regional map to create a space of
common concern for the participating States. In spite of some boundary
issues between parties, the States agreed to focus on blurring political
boundaries for purposes of achieving the objectives of the CTI and
instead redefining their cooperation on the basis of bio-geographical
borders. If conservation and restoration are to be effective at the
ecosystem level, States in the region understand that they must cooperate
across their political boundaries since the maps of the ecoregions and
functional seascapes within the Coral Triangle do not conform to either
existing political boundaries or desired political boundaries. To the
extent that States accept the validity of the ecoregions and acknowledge
ecological overlaps across the borders of the Philippines and Indonesia,
Timor and Indonesia, and Malaysia and Indonesia, States participating
in the Coral Triangle Initiative have shown a willingness to re-imagine
resource management in spatial delimitations that are very different
from UNCLOS’ conventional jurisdictional zones that reify sovereign
rights of use at the expense of ecological cooperation.
For example, the States have developed a common understanding
for a Coral Triangle Marine Protected Area System that connects the
six States across ecological borders. The States are in the process of
developing a CTI Regional Framework that establishes joint goals,
objectives, and operational designs across a network of MPAs. In
addition, the States have acknowledged the need for a common regional
29
30

Ibid. at 2
Coral Triangle Initiative Secretariat, Regional Plan of Action (2009)
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framework based on implementing an ecosystem approach to the
management of fisheries resources.31
The level of political will involved with building collaboration
within the CTI is high with regular meetings among a Council of
Ministers and Senior Officials. With the support of intergovernmental
funding (Global Environmental Facility) and large NGOs such as World
Wide Fund for Nature, The Nature Conservancy, and Conservation
International, the CTI has maintained institutional momentum through
the creation of a permanent secretariat that not only supports the efforts
of the governments but facilitates private sector involvement in the
government initiative. The Secretariat has its own legal personality
separate from the States and operates independently. It serves as
a regional coordinator hosting a number of on-line collaborative
workspaces for both Senior Officials and Local Government Mayors
from municipalities in the various States designed to build a virtual
community.
B. SARGASSO SEA COMMISSION
The Sargasso Sea is an almost 2 million square mile sea region
that includes region beyond national jurisdiction. It is a place rich in
biodiversity with significant populations of tuna, billfish, eels, sharks,
whales, sea turtles, and rare invertebrate species. The region is named
after the presence of beds of sargassum, a type of seaweed critical
for the ecosystem. The region faces a number of threats including oil
pollution, overfishing, plastic pollution, and the introduction of exotic
species that compete with endemic species.
In 2010 with support from States, intergovernmental organizations,
and NGOs, the Sargasso Sea Project was created to raise awareness of the
threats to the Sargasso Sea. In 2014, under the leadership of Bermuda,
a number of States with territory bordering the region concluded The
Putrajaya Joint Ministerial Statement, 4th Meeting of the CTI-CFF Council of Ministers (26 November 2012) CTI Initiative (Supporting “an Ecosystem Approach to
Fisheries Management in Coral Triangle Initiative) (http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.
org/sites/default/files/resources/SOM%208%20and%20MM%204%20FINAL%20
PUTRAJAYA%20JOINT%20MINISTERIAL%20STATEMENT%281%29.pdf; 8th
CTI_CFF Senior Officials Meeting (22-24 November 2012) (“Acknowledging the
need for common regional framework to manage fisheries resources”)
31
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Hamilton Declaration on Collaboration for the Conservation of the
Sargasso Sea.32 Other States have indicated support for the Sargasso
Sea project. 33 Under the Declaration the States agreed to have meetings
as necessary and to rely on a permanently constituted Sargasso Sea
Secretariat to work closely with the Sargasso Sea Commission to
exercise a stewardship role over the Sargasso Sea. In 2015, the Saragasso
Sea was the only named ecosystem in the United Nations Global
Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Environment
report. Representatives from the Sargasso Sea Project have worked
closely with existing intergovernmental organizations such as the North
Atlantic Fisheries Organization to systematically address threats to the
ecosystem by for-example regulating trawling activities and prohibiting
fishing on seamounts. The project has also worked with numerous
other bodies including inter alia the International Commission for
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the Caribbean Regional Sea programs,
and the International Maritime Organization.
The States agreed to develop a joint work program that includes
recognizing the ecological importance of the Sargasso Sea, developing
joint fisheries habitat conservation programs, identifying impacts from
international shipping and other marine activities, and conserving
migratory species.
C BENGUELA CURRENT BENGUELA CURRENT LARGE
MARINE ECOSYSTEM PROJECT
Located in one of the most productive upwelling zones in the world,
the Benguela Current LME (BCLME) is a biologically diverse shared
ocean space that connects the Exclusive Economic Zones of Angola,
Namibia, and South Africa. The region is facing a number of threats
including lower fishing yields, deterioration in water quality, destruction
of both coastal and seabed habitat, and harmful algal blooms.
The BCLME conservation, restoration, and sustainable use program
has been supported at the highest political levels in the three countries
Bermuda, Monaco, the United Kingdom and the United States are also signatories
to the declaration.
33
Dominican Republic, Netherlands, Sweden, South Africa, and Trinidad and Tobago
have indicated support for the Commission.
32
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leading to the 2013 adoption of the binding Benguela Current Convention
in which the three States recognized their “joint responsibility as
custodians” of the BCLME.34 In the treaty, the States agreed that the
terms of the Convention will apply to “all areas within the national
sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance” with UNCLOS” bounded
by the high-water mark along the coasts of the Parties.”35
The BCLME and the Convention grew out of a previous engagement
by the three States in a program called “Benguela Environment Fisheries
Interaction and Training Program” (BENEFIT) that was financed by
the Norwegian and German government through their development aid
agencies.
Structurally, the BCLME depends on government commitment for
its existence. On typically an annual basis,36 Ministers from each of the
countries attend a Ministerial Conference with a national delegation.
In 2007, the ministers agreed to create the first global LME-based
institution, the Benguela Current Commission, to facilitate State
cooperation and cooperation with private actors around restoring
commercial fish stocks in the region.37 Based in Swakopmund, Namibia,
the Commission works closely with the BCLME Management Board
consisting of representatives from a number of ministries in each of the
State.38
The management board is somewhat unique in its wider participation
from not just environmental ministries but also commercial industries.
Presently Angola sends representatives from its Fisheries Institute,
Petroleum Ministry, and the Ministry of Urbanism & Environment.
Namibia sends representatives from the Ministry of Mines &
The Benguela Current Convention (2013) at www.benguelaacc.org/index.php/en/
component/docman/doc_download/695-signed-benguela-current-convention-english
35
Ibid. at Article 3.
36
Ibid. at Article 6 (Providing that a Conference shall be convened at least every two
years)
37
Interim Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Angola, Government of the Republic of Namibia, and the Government of the Republic of South Africa
on the Establishment of the Benguela Current Commission(January 2007)
38
The Benguela Current Commission also works with intergovernmental programmes
such as the Regional Seas Programme for the West and Central Africa Region, civil
society groups, private sector, and academia.
34
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Energy, the Ministry of Fisheries & Marine Resources, the Ministry
of Environment & Tourism, and the Ministry of Works & Transport.
Finally, South Africa’s delegation includes individuals from Department
of Environmental Affairs; Department of Agriculture, Forestry &
Fisheries; Petroleum Agency, and Department of Mineral Resources.
The composition of the Benguela Current Commission brings together
multiple department who may have conflicting agency agendas. To
avoid certain types of conflicts, the Board has negotiated a Rules of
Procedure guide.
In addition to the Management Board and the Secretariat, the
BCLME has an Ecosystem Advisory Committee and a Permanent
Compliance Committee.39 Under the Ecosystem Advisory Committee,
scientists and managers from each of the three countries cooperate
in Joint Working groups. The Permanent Compliance Committee is
expected to coordinate compliance activities across the three States.
The States have agreed to work towards developing and
implementing a joint programme of work based on the “Strategic
Action Plan” for developing scientific advice, implementing training
and capacity building, sustainably exploiting and managing living and
non-living marine resources, conserving biodiversity, and preventing
acute and chronic pollution. States have agreed to work cooperatively
to minimize the impacts of marine diamond mining, oil production, and
gas production. They have also agreed to work to harmonize regional
mariculture policies to avoid harmful algal blooms.40
To ensure the involvement of each State in the process of nationally
implementing the Strategic Action Plan, each State has an “Activity
Centre” that is funded by both donors and the participating governments.
The three Centres are expected to coordinate with each other and to
facilitate the “Advisory Groups”, consisting of 2 individuals from each
country, in providing technical support within the region. Through
the BCLME program, over 100 projects including a number of
transboundary projects (e.g. analyzing and mitigating impact of offshore
diamond mining of other marine resources) have been implemented by
Benguela Current Convention at Article 10 and Article 12.
Benguela Current Strategic Action Programme (1999) http://projects.inweh.unu.
edu/inweh/inweh/content/StrategicActionProgrammes/bclme_sap_1999.html
39
40
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government agencies, universities, private groups, and BENEFIT.
The BCLME program has used its resources to understand the
strengths and weaknesses of each State in terms of national and
local policies to facilitate both ecosystem based management and
socio-economic development. In 2009, an outside consultant report
suggested that far more was known in each of the States about biological
management indicator than social, economic, or governance indicators.
The BCLME program has strengthened its transboundary governance
through the formation of the intergovernmental Commission and the
tripartite treaty. Notably, the BCLME program inspired the Guinea
Current LME to initiate a process for developing an inter-governmental
commission to facilitate efforts across the member States.
III.CHALLENGES INHERENT IN LME GOVERNANCE
EFFORTS
The value in creating and governing at the level of an LME or a
seascape is the deployment of limited state resources to negotiate across
socio-ecological borders for the good of all participants and not simply
to reinforce boundaries.41 Each of the examples of LME governance
described above are testaments to high-level political cooperation.
Managing an LME over the long-term requires institutional sustainability
based on continued good relations among State and other partners. The
remainder of this section focuses on six challenges that are inherent
in any LME governance effort and describes what the LME programs
described above are trying to do to address basic governance problems.
1) Sustaining political will
The first challenge for any LME-type institution or framework is
sustaining political will. After an initial wave of excitement for a new
project, it is not uncommon for political will to fade as the complexities
of implementation manifest in political disagreements between
constituents. Political figures may find themselves at the crosshairs of
This article recognizes that while there are some differences between an LME, a
seascape as defined by Conservation International, and an ecoregion, all of these concepts promote large scale conservation and sustainable use practices. For purposes of
the remainder of this article, these concepts may be used interchangeably.
41
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controversy when certain environmental objectives such as conserving
species or habitat clash with socio-economic objectives such as
increasing coastal development to build a tourist economy or reducing
fishing effort.
The CTI program has continued high levels of political engagement
across the region. This political will can be explained in part by
frequent meetings between ministers and between senior officials that
contribute good working relationships between individuals on behalf of
their States. In some instances, the existence of the CTI program has
encouraged more robust participation from State members. At the State
responsible for founding the CTI, Indonesia has continued to invest in
the initiative. Tagged as the second largest plastic polluter in the world,
Indonesia made a public announcement in March 2017 that it would
invest up to $1 billion a year to reduce plastic in its waters that are
contributing to water quality issues for the Coral Triangle.42
The BCLME program has likewise relied on high-level meetings
to create a high-level of political engagement by each of the States.
At the last Benguela Current Commission Ministerial Conference in
December 2016, nine ministers from each of the three States discussed
opportunities to collaborate on a number of joint issues including pooling
of research vessels for the potential co-management of resources,
combatting illegal fishing, conducting studies on phosphate mining
on the seabed floor, and cooperating to develop oil spill contingency
planning for the region including a regional oil spill response center.43
2) Sustaining long-term stakeholder interest
Stakeholders are parties that may not “own” a project but instead
influence the success of a project by transferring skills, knowledge,
information, finances, or personal connections. In all of the above
projects, the “owners’ of the projects are the sovereign States that
are willing to temporarily relax the rigidness of territorial boundaries
for purposes of achieving the common objectives of large-scale
conservation and sustainable development planning. The stakeholders
J. Langenheim, ‘Indonesia Pledges $1bn a year to Curb Ocean Waste’, The Guardian (2 March 2017) (Pledging to reduce its marine waste by 70% by 2025)
43
Communique of the 5th Benguela Current Convention Ministerial Conference
Meeting, Swakopmund, Namibia (8 December 2016)
42
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facilitate the achievement of project objectives.
In the case of the CTI, the stakeholders include both States (United
States and Australia), intergovernmental entities (Asian Development
Bank and Global Environmental Facility), and NGOs (World Wide Fund
for Nature, Conservation International, and The Nature Conservancy).
In each of these cases, the stakeholders are not only essential for
the financial and sometime technical feasibility of the CTI but they also
contribute to the perception of credibility for the various project by
attaching their logos to various CTI . Taken together, the three examples
seem to suggest that the success of LME governance, in regions where
there are funding needs, will depend on what types of partners are
willing to invest in an LME and what types of expenses they might
cover that would otherwise go unfunded. For example, while a State
government can politically justify using its limited funding for antipoverty efforts, that State may depend on NGOs or third-party States
to cover any additional expenses whose primary purpose is to protect
marine resources.
Sustaining stakeholder interest for a given project, particularly a
project that has not yet demonstrated its value, may become increasingly
challenging when funders and donors have an array of global marine
governance project to choose among for funding purposes. Increasing
the number of regional MPAs brings conservation benefits to those
regions but may also lead in the long-term to thinner coverage of
budgets for projects as more States compete for limited resources. At the
outset of programs such as the examples discussed above, States should
negotiate with potential non-State partners for long-term financing
that might include bonuses for achieving certain targets ahead of any
timelines. Depending on the stakeholder, there may be reluctance to
guarantee funding beyond an initial period. While funders may want
to maintain flexibility, their desire may compromise the ability of
programs to achieve long-term goals such as ecological restoration.
3) Technical Coordination across boundaries within the LME project
To the extent that there is a broad political support for an ecosystem
based management approach across a region, there remain practical
challenges of coordinating technical expertise across different groups.
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States within a region may have very different capacities to achieve
agreed upon work plans. Depending on whether a State follows a
federalist model, certain parts of a State may also be better positioned to
engage in ecosystem protection and community development than other
parts of the State leading to different balances of power. Coordination
problems may also arise due to the existence of different institutional
cultures within agencies responsible for technical implementation of
joint work plans.
These issues have arisen in the case of the projects described above.
In reviewing its progress in achieving ecosystem protection goals, the
Sargasso Sea Project has observed that intersectoral communication
between bodies such as the IMO and regional fisheries bodies can be
quite weak. The BCLME project has attempted to address some of these
challenges through its introduction of Activity Centres within each of
the member states designed to share information and expertise.
4) Inability to Address Problems Arising Outside of the Project Area
For any large marine ecosystem project, there will be a recurring
challenge of addressing impacts on the shared ecosystems arise from
drivers outside of the boundaries of the project. For all of the project,
climate impacts such as ocean acidification have the potential to
undermine the joint work effort of States. CTI and Sargasso Sea.
The existing governance structures cannot manage causes of
degradation that are largely external to the region. States could decide
that they wish to put diplomatic pressure on States that are impacting
their efforts and raise issues of State responsibility.
No amount of internal political will can eliminate the externalities
being created by States who are not parties to these initiatives. However,
States within an initiative can still use their cooperative frameworks for
further regional goals such as climate mitigation and adaptation. In each
of the initiatives described above, all of the States involve contribute
some amount to climate change. In some cases, the contributions are
de minimis while in other cases such as the Sargasso Sea project and
Coral Triangle Initiative, contributions by participants such as the
United States and Indonesia are sizable. Existing cooperation under
the initiatives and the good will generated by the initiative might offer
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additional motivation for certain parties to invest further in reducing not
just their regional footprint but also their global environmental impact.
5) Negotiating the needs of ecosystems with demands of human
communities
The need to achieve short-term social and economic benefits for
communities can conflict with long-term environmental considerations.
For each of the projects, there are numerous coastal communities
within the region that depend on the various marine resources that are
being managed jointly or being proposed for joint management for
subsistence. In theory, a full implementation of the work projects for
any of these programs should result in better conditions for stabilizing
natural resources for community use. To achieve the work plans
especially plans based on restoration, however, requires a change in
coastal activities over an extended time frame. For communities that are
already vulnerable to food security challenges, conflicts may emerge in
areas where, for example, there are proposals for protected areas that
threaten available food resources.
States involved in LME projects must communicate openly with
communities about what ecosystem based management projects
entail and how the States intend to address fundamental needs such
as food security. States cannot expect sacrifices from communities
that are already socially and economically marginalized for the sake
of improving the global reputation of a State as an “environmental
champion.” Providing for both the needs of ecosystems and the demands
of human communities without creating a situation of “winners and
losers” requires extensive and ongoing negotiations. These negotiations
will involve transaction costs.
6) Investment in conservation may not be enough and there will be an
increasing need for investment in ecological restoration.
In each of the LME based projects described above, conservation
of marine resources particularly living marine resources such as shared
fisheries is a priority project objective. Conservation measures, however,
may not be sufficient in places where ecosystems are at ecological
tipping points. As pressures on ocean ecosystems multiply, States will
need to give more attention to investing in ecological restoration of
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habitats, especially habitats that generate ecosystem services for coastal
communities.
For example, in the Coral Triangle, almost 70% of citizen’s protein
intake is from fish that exist in coral reef ecosystems. The President
of the Global Coral Reef Alliance has observed that conservation and
continued study of the reefs will not address the CTI’s long-term needs.
He has instead called for investment in new restoration techniques such
as artificial reefs that are capable of surviving the double threats of global
warming and pollution. As he observed at a coral reef management
symposium, “ Restoring the world’s richest and most productive reefs
on a large scale should be the very central focus for planning the
sustainable development of the world’s largest island nations.”44
When States embark on a LME program, it is increasingly
important to consider the human resource, financial, and development
implications of restoration. Global environmental politics including
SDG Target 14.5 have called for increasing conservation of coastal and
marine areas. This has been understood as delineating protected areas.
While there is no inherent conflict in undertaking ecological restoration
within an area designating as protected,45 there have not been many
sufficient international investments made at the LME level to prepare
and support communities to undertake restoration projects that will
provide community with long-term benefits.46
7) Need for full regional participation by States
When political boundaries diverge from “ecological borders”, States
Thomas Goreau, Coral Reef and Fisheries Habitat Restoration in the Coral Triangle:
The Key to Sustainable Reef Management, Proceedings of Coral Reef Management
Symposium on Coral Triangle Area (2010): 251 available at http://www.globalcoral.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Coral-Reef-and-Fisheries-Habitat-Restoration-inthe-Coral-Triangle.pdf
45
For example IUCN understands MPAs as areas designated to “provide for the protection, restoration, wise use, understanding and enjoyment of the marine heritage of
the world in perpetuity” IUCN General Assembly Resolution 19.46 (1994)
46
There are significant initiatives that are involved closely with communities such
as the Coral Reef Targeted Research & Capacity Building for Management and the
Capturing Coral Reef and Related Ecosystem Services (CCRES) (http://ccres.net/).
Yet these programs are limited in their reach. For example, the CCRES is limited due
to resources and program capacity to working within the Philippines and Indonesia.
44
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need to cooperate if resources are to be adequately and holistically
managed. This requires “deep cooperation” requiring investments of
financial and human resources and not just surface cooperation. Because
of the transboundary nature of many of the ocean habitats split by
arbitrary boundaries, States that deliver only surface cooperation might
become free-riders on the investments by other States. If too many
States within a region free-ride in spite of contrary political statements,
then the non-participation of just a few States can undercut the efforts
of the other States.
8) Regional participation has to be translated into national, subnational, and local initiatives.
The success of a LME project will depend on the ability to take a
large-scale concept and to identify how it can be implemented across
an array of governance actors including local communities who may
be politically detached from their central government or in very remote
locations. Two of the programs described above have incorporated
recognition of the principle of subsidiarity. The CTI has a collaboration
tool for mayors to work across the Coral Triangle. The Benguela LME
program works through its Activity Centres to identify local initiatives
for funding that will further the objectives of the States across the LME.
9) Actors at a national or sub-national level need to ensure that
international economic drivers do not undermine national, subnational, or local initiatives
States have complex governance models for natural resources.
Assuming that communities have the resources to invest in ecosystem
restoration and make these investments, States or sub-national
governments need to protect community efforts. This may prove
challenging as States face a conflict of interest between potential
State revenues and community needs. For at least some States,
revenues from foreign fishing fleets comprise a substantial amount
of a government budget. States may need to forego these revenues
and identify alternative sources of government revenues in order to
protect community investments. This can lead to interpersonal conflicts
between government ministries and their long-term objectives for
economic growth versus social development. In potentially restraining
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international access to resources, State officials may find themselves
under a great deal of diplomatic pressure.
IV. MODELS FOR ADOPTION FOR OTHER SEASCAPES?
A number of States are investing in transboundary LME projects.
The question arises whether the models described above should
be replicated in other regions of the world where States are yet not
engaging in “deep cooperation” across political boundaries but would
benefit from applying a harmonized ecosystem approach to the region.
In theory, regional seas organizations and regional fisheries bodies
exist to cooperate across boundaries. Yet, in many cases, States have
been wary about investing both financial and political capital into the
long-term success of these programmes. Created in 1974, the Regional
Seas Programmes were introduced to provide a common space for
addressing marine pollution control and management of marine and
coastal resources. The evaluation of outcomes related to regional
improvements of environmental quality has been difficult to measure.
While some of the programmes such as those based in the Mediterranean
Sea and Antarctica have delivered more tangible cooperation among the
States parties, a few programs in other regions have lacked momentum
with States only providing minimal financing and inconsistent political
support.47
The models described above have received political support not
just by states located within the region but also from other States. For
example, in July 2007, the Leaders Declaration at the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation meeting expressed support for the Coral
Triangle initiative. In December 2007, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations with the endorsement from China, Japan, and Korea
further confirmed the value of the CTI as a governance initiative.
Is there potential for State-led, NGO-supported LME projects in
other biodiverse regions including the East China Sea, the South China
M.A. Jacobson, ‘The United Nations’ Regional Seas Programme: How Does it
Measure Up?’, Coastal Management, 23(1) (1995) : 19-39; Charles N. Ehler, ‘A
Global Strategic Review: Regional Seas Programme, United Nations Environment
Programme’ (2006)
47
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Sea and the Arctic. In all of these regions, States have identified ongoing
conflicts over boundaries. In the East and South China Sea regions,
China, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei disagree
over both territorial and maritime boundaries. These disagreements
have led to military confrontations and poor decisions regarding longterm environmental protection. 48 In the Arctic, States disagree over the
extent of extended continental shelves and the reach of jurisdiction.49
Recognising that the States that are involved with each of the models
described above have generally stable political relations, there is some
question as to whether a similar arrangement could emerge where
participating States might have fundamental political disagreements.
The success of any such initiative would depend on the most political
powerful States taking leadership of any joint effort. In the case of the
South China Sea, Chinese leadership would be essential as a driver
for any shared ecological initiative. Likewise, in the Arctic, Russian
or Canadian leadership would be required for any initiative to have
sufficient political to succeed. Such leadership depends on whether
political leaders identify investments in ecosystem management and
sustainable development as part of their historic legacy.
Likewise, even though political leaders receive most of the publicity
attention associated with these initiatives, the success of initiatives
will also depend, at least initially, on NGO or intergovernmental
investments to demonstrate the value of the projects. For each of the
models described above, early financial investments and investments
in capacity building laid the foundation for the emergence of the Coral
Triangle Initiative Secretariat, the Sargasso Sea Commission and the
Benguela Current Commission,
V. CONCLUSION
This article suggests that a group of States have acknowledged
that adequate ecosystem management, particularly in a changing
In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, The Republic of the Philippines
and The People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award.
49
‘Frozen Conflict’, The Economist (7 December 2014) https://www.economist.com/
news/international/21636756-denmark-claims-north-pole-frozen-conflict
48
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climate, requires imaginative thinking about how to work flexibly
across delineated political boundaries. These States are trying
through the development of innovative governance institutions to do
something constructive even though they face a variety of challenges in
reconceiving boundaries into borders.
From a public international law perspective, the models of
cooperation discussed previously are interesting since they indicate an
active effort on the part of States to maintain control over activities within
their boundaries and address certain types of transboundary harms.
With a focus on managing large marine ecosystems for sustainability
and ecosystem protection, the governance models advance a different
biogeographical map than a map based exclusively on geopolitical
boundaries. Importantly, States in each the three models are using
their political capital to secure success by maintaining engagements in
these initiatives at Ministerial levels. These are not simply projects for
technocrats but are increasingly becoming part of the identity of the
States within the region.
There have been numerous calls for networks of marine protected
areas capable of linking across ocean ecosystems to include both
national waters and the high seas.50 The success of these endeavour
will depend on the ability of States that are committed to the MPAs to
create appropriate governance mechanisms that take into consideration
socio-economic needs and the necessity for ecological restoration. In
all of the examples above, the States have agreed to set aside certain
political differences with each other in order to build a different kind
of ecological “commons” where States will strive to improve national
performance in order to meet joint objectives. While it is easy to
imagine that an acute political crisis could dissolve the goodwill that
has been built through these existing initiatives, each of the LME
models described above offers hope for shaping potential future LME
efforts in areas divided by conflict. Long-term success will depend on
States observing desirable socio-ecological outcomes and on political
engagement at all levels including local communities who interact with
B.C. O’Leary et al., ‘The first network of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the
high seas: The process, the challenges and where next’ Marine Policy 36(2) (2012):
598-605
50

303

Anastasia Telesetsky

resources.
Distinguishing between boundaries and borders is essential for
governance of LMEs. Because political boundaries rarely coincide
with ecologically connected habitats, new models of governance are
becoming increasingly important.
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